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MICHAEL FRANCIS MOORE, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) ________ ) 
NO. 40525 
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2009-11603 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Francis Moore asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of 
the Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 479 (Ct. App. April 25, 2014) (hereinafter, 
Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his Judgment of Conviction, was 
in conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals 
because the Court of Appeals decision did not properly consider whether the existing 
mental health evaluations and reports relied upon by the district court were sufficient to 
comply with the requirements of I .C. § 19-2522. 
1 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On morning of June 25, 2009, law enforcement officials responded a 
shoplifting report. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSl), 1 p.2.) 
Mr. was intoxicated and had shoplifted a six pack of Mike's Hard Lemonade2 
from a drugstore. (PSI, p.2.) As Mr. Moore was leaving the store, he struck a loss 
prevention specialist who tried to detain him. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Moore was charged by 
Information with one count of burglary, one count of petit theft, and one count of simple 
battery. 3 (R., pp.24-25.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Moore pied guilty to the burglary charge and 
the other charges were dismissed. (12/01/09 Tr., L.s.2-13; , pp.39-40, 41-47.) 
Although the terms of the plea agreement provided that the State to recommend 
probation, the plea agreement provided that the State's recommendation would be 
conditioned upon, inter alia, the defendant having no failures to appear. (12/01/09 
Tr., p.3, Ls.8-12; R., pp.42-47.) The district court ordered a PSI and a substance abuse 
evaluation prior to sentencing. (12/01/09 Tr., p.14, L.8-p.15, L.1.) 
Mr. Moore failed to appear at sentencing and the district court issued an arrest 
warrant. (R., pp.48-50.) Mr. Moore was arrested on the warrant. (R., p.50.) The 
sentencing hearing was continued several times to allow Mr. Moore sufficient time to 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file containing 
the PSI, and all included attachments. These documents will hereinafter be described 
as the "PSI" for ease of reference. 
2 Mike's Hard Lemonade is an alcoholic beverage. 
3 Mr. Moore was initially charged with a single count of robbery (R., pp.6-7), but the 
robbery charge was subsequently amended to burglary and two new crimes were 
added-petit theft and misdemeanor battery. (R., pp.17-18.) 
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the .4 (3/30/10 Tr., p.3, 0.) During one such hearing on March 23, 10, 
Mr. Moore's counsel advised district court that, at the time of the incident, Mr. Moore 
was experiencing symptoms of his mental illness and, based on a recent conversation 
with him the jail, she believed that his mental health issues likely played a "very big 
role" in the incident. (3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-9.) Defense counsel asked the court to 
order a mental health evaluation. (3/23/10 Tr., p:10, Ls.13-16.) The district court 
reviewed Mr. Moore's mental health history contained in the records attached to the PSI 
and noted that: 
\Nell, a pure evaluation I have the benefit of the report from 
lntermountain hospital of 28th of '05, the discharge, which lays 
diagnosis on Axis I with schizoaffective disorder with alcohol and 
abuse, along with some other things. 
And then we have a psychiatric evaluation that was done by Saint 
Alphonsus on I love the way they hid the dates of these things. Well, 
again, this is in August of '08. There is a it doesn't read the same, 
necessarily, as a court-ordered evaluation, but I think it tells me what I'm 
going to find out from a court-ordered evaluation, that the defendant does 
have a history of schizophrenic-type mental illness. 
So I'm not inclined to continue this for mental health - I mean, the records 
go back - I was just trying to remember how far back they went. And they 
go back clear to 2002. I'm looking at one in January of '04 where he 
presents at the emergency department with histories of hearing voices 
and definitely psychotic state. So, Counsel, I'm not inclined to [order a 
mental health evaluation]. 
(3/23/10Tr., p.11, L.8-p.12, L.3.) 
At the sentencing hearing the State asked to be released from its obligations 
under the plea agreement, as Mr. Moore had failed to appear for his sentencing 
4 Mr. Moore advised the court that he does not read very well and needed additional 
time to review the PSI. (PSI, p.56.) 
3 
hearing.5 (3/30/10 Tr., p.3, Ls.3-18.) The did not object, asked that 
Mr. Moore be placed on probation with mental health and 
(R., pp.59-60; 3/30/10 Tr., p.7, L.24 p.8, L.15.) 
treatment. 
The district court imposed upon Mr. Moore a sentence of five years, with one 
year fixed. (3/30/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-3; R., pp.61-63, 72-74.) Thereafter, Mr. Moore filed 
a timely I.C.R. 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence. (R., pp.70-71.) Although 
Mr. Moore provided new information for the district court to consider in support of his 
I.C.R. 35 motion for leniency, the district court denied Mr. Moore's motion. (R, pp.86-
88.) 
After a post-conviction action, the district court 
Conviction on November 19, 201 thereby restoring Mr. 
the Judgment of 
right to appeal. 
(R., pp.90-91.) On November 29, 2012, Mr. Moore filed a notice of appeal timely from 
the re-entered Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.92-94.) 
On appeal, Mr. Moore asserted that the district court erred in failing to order a 
mental health evaluation of Mr. Moore prior to sentencing. Mr. Moore also contends 
that the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce his sentence in light of 
Mr. Moore's mental health issues and other mitigating factors, as well as the additional 
information submitted in conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court. (Opinion, 
p.1.) Judge Melanson's lead opinion6 found that the issue of whether an evaluation 
5 Mr. Moore was homeless and "living on the streets" for more than a month before he 
failed to appear for his sentencing hearing. (PSI, p.13.) 
6 The lead opinion, authored by Judge Melanson, was not the majority opinion. Judge 
Lansing, who concurred in the result, wrote separately. Judge Gutierrez joined Judge 
4 
should have to I § 1 was for appellate 
review where counsel requested an evaluation under a different statute. (Opinion, ) 
Judge Melanson opined that Mr. Moore failed to articulate below the specific grounds 
argued on appeal, and the basis for the specific grounds argued on appeal was not 
apparent from the context of the argument made below. (Opinion, p.2.) Thus, the lead 
opinion of the Court concluded that the precise issue argued on appeal was not 
preserved below, and Mr. Moore was unable to satisfy the first prong of the Perry 
fundamental error standard. (Opinion, pp.2-3.) Judge Lansing's majority opinion 
concurred in the result, but did not agree with the lead opinion's that the 
issue raised on appeal was not preserved for (Opinion, p.4.) The majority 
opinion concluded that the district court correctly determined that new evaluation was 
not necessary in light of the extensive information on Mr. Moore's mental health that 
was already before the district court. (Opinion, p.4.) 
Mr. Moore timely filed a Petition for Review. 




Is the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming Mr. Moore's Judgment of Conviction in 
conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of 
Appeals in that the decision did not properly consider whether the existing mental health 
evaluations and reports relied upon by the district court were sufficient to comply with 
the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522? 
6 
ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Moore's Judgment Of 
Conviction Is In Conflict With Applicable Decisions Of the Idaho Supreme Court And 
The Idaho Court Of Appeals In That The Decision Did Not Properly Consider Whether 
The Existing Mental Health Evaluations And Reports Relied Upon By The District Court 
Were Sufficient To Comply With The Requirements Of I.C. § 19-2522 
A Introduction 
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals erroneously determined that the 
district court was not required to order a new evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, in 
contravention of Idaho statute and established case law. Both the plain language of 
§ 19-2522 and Idaho case law make clear that once the record reflected that 
Moore had a substantial history of serious mental illness such his mental 
condition would a significant factor at sentencing, the district court was mandated to 
order a psychological evaluation unless an evaluation under I.C. § 1 had been 
ordered and the resulting report satisfied the requirements of I.C. §19-2522(3). Instead, 
the district court relied on prior evaluations and reports prepared anywhere from 2-27 
years prior to Mr. Moore's sentencing; however, these reports and evaluations fell far 
short of the requirements mandated by I.C. § 19- 2522.7 
B. The Objection By Trial Counsel Properly Preserved Mr. Moore's Issue On Appeal 
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals is somewhat confusing, as the judge in the 
minority, Judge Melanson, authored the lead opinion. (Opinion, pp.1-4.) Judge 
Melanson's opinion found the issue of whether the district court erred in failing to order 
7 At the time of Mr. Moore's sentencing, the statute did provide for an exception-where 
an evaluation under I.C. § 19-2524 has been ordered and the resulting report satisfies 
the requirements of I.C. §19-2522(3). I.C. § 19-2522(6). Such is not the case here, as 
the report ordered pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524 analyzed only Mr. Moore's substance 
abuse. (PSI, pp.22-31.) 
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an I.C. § 1 was not preserved and, thus, his opinion did not 
whether the district court in refusing to order a psychological evaluation. 
(Opinion, pp.1 ) The majority of the Court correctly held that the issue had been 
below, but found that the previous years' reports and evaluations were 
sufficient. (Opinion, p.4.) 
In State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court held, "[f]or 
an objection to be preserved for appellate review, either the specific ground for the 
objection must be clearly stated ... or the basis of the objection must be apparent form 
the context." Id. at 277. As the majority of the Court correctly determined, the issue of 
the district court erred in denying Mr. Moore's motion for further evaluation of 
his health was properly preserved. Defense counsel, after advising that her 
client was experiencing symptoms of his mental illness when he committed the crime, 
requested a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524. (3/23/10 Tr., p.10, 
Ls.13-16.) Although Mr. Moore never requested an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation by citing 
to that specific section in the Idaho Code, the ground for the objection was clearly 
stated-that Mr. Moore was experiencing the symptoms of his mental illness such that it 
would be a significant factor at sentencing. Thus the basis of the objection was clear 
from the context within which the objection was made, and the district court had ample 
opportunity to consider the request for a court-ordered evaluation of Mr. Moore's mental 
health. 
While "Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for appeal 
through an objection at trial, State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), in this case, trial 
counsel did object to the district court going forward with sentencing without an 
8 
additional, court-ordered evaluation of Mr. Moore's mental illness, and counsel's 
explanation of the basis for request to notify the district court that 
Mr. Moore's mental illness was serious and would be a significant factor at sentencing. 
(3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-16.) In Peny, the Court explained that the fundamental error 
rule serves to induce the timely raising of claims and objections, which gives the trial 
court the opportunity to consider and resolve them. Id. at 224. In Mr. Moore's case, the 
error was objected to and therefore the Perry fundamental error analysis is inapplicable. 
Here, counsel asked the district court to order an evaluation after she indicated that 
Mr. Moore's mental illness "probably played a very big role in this incident." (3/23/10 
Tr., p.1 6.) The district court was thus on notice that Mr. Moore's mental illness 
would be a significant factor sentencing, and had ample opportunity to consider the 
request and resolve the issue by ordering an evaluation of Mr. Moore under I.C. § 1 
2522. 
C. The Opinion Did Not Properly Consider Whether The Existing Mental Health 
Evaluations And Reports Relied Upon By The District Court Were Sufficient To 
Comply With The Requirements Of I.C. § 19-2522 
The lead opinion of the Court of Appeals failed to reach the merits of Mr. Moore's 
claim-whether the district court erred by refusing to order a psychological evaluation 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. (Opinion, pp.1-3.) The concurring opinion-which is 
actually the majority opinion-did reach the merits of Mr. Moore's claim and held that 
the district court did not err because Mr. Moore's prior evaluations were sufficient, but 
did not offer any analysis as to why it found that the old evaluations were sufficient, and 
it did not specifically address the sufficiency of the old evaluations in light of the 
requirements contained in I.C. § 19-2522. (Opinion, p.4.) Although the statute at issue 
9 
was amended in 2012 to allow a district court other mental health 
Mr. Moore was sentenced in 2010, prior to the amendment. !.C. § 1 
In 2010, the statute provided that only a report prepared pursuant to I.C. § 19-
could be used, in certain circumstances, in lieu of a new report: 
If a mental health examination of the defendant has previously 
conducted pursuant to section 19-2524, Idaho Code, and a report of such 
examination has been submitted to the court, and if the court determines 
that such examination and report provide the necessary information 
required by this section, including all of the information specified in 
subsection (3) of this section, then the court may consider such 
examination and report as the examination and report required by this 
section and need not order an additional examination of the defendant's 
mental condition. 
I.C. § 19-2522(6) (2010). However, the 2012 statutory amendment broadened the type 
of suitable mental health examinations permitted under the statute: 
If a mental health examination of the defendant has previously been 
conducted, whether pursuant to section 19-2524, Idaho Code, or for any 
other purpose, and a report of such examination has been submitted to 
the court, and if the court determines that such examination and report 
provide the necessary information required in subsection (3) of this 
section, and the examination is sufficiently recent to reflect the defendant's 
present mental condition, then the court may consider such prior 
examination and report as the examination and report required by this 
section and need not order an additional examination of the defendant's 
mental condition. 
I.C. § 19-2522(6) (emphasis added) ( See 2012 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 225, § 3, p.611, 
effective July 1, 2012).8 
Idaho Code Section 19-2522(6) provides that the district court may forgo ordering 
a new psychological evaluation where, "a mental health examination of the defendant 
has previously been conducted pursuant to section 19-2524, Idaho Code" and the 
report contains "the necessary information required by this section, including all of the 
8 All further citations to I.C. § 19-2522 will be to the 2010 version. 
10 
information specified in subsection (3) of this section." § 19-2522(6). 
information statutorily required to be contained in the evaluation is not just what 
illness the defendant had been previously diagnosed with, but also: 
(a) A description of the nature the examination; 
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of 
the defendant; 
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect 
and level of functional impairment; 
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the 
defendant's mental condition; 
( e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or 
nontreatment; 
(f) A consideration of the risk danger which defendant 
create for the public if at 
I.C. § 19-2522(3). 
The majority Opinion of the Court of Appeals succinctly concluded, "the district 
court correctly determined that a new psychological evaluation was not needed in view 
of the extensive information already before the district court concerning Moore's mental 
health condition and history." (Opinion, p.4.) However, the Court failed to offer any 
analysis of whether the information available to the district court at sentencing complied 
with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). Thus, it appears the majority opinion may 
have improperly relied on the 2012 amended version of the statute, which allows for use 
of prior reports provided certain conditions are met. Because at the time of Mr. Moore's 
sentencing, only an evaluation conducted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524, provided certain 
conditions were met, could be used in place of a new psychological evaluation under 
11 
§ 1 Court improperly found the evaluations before the 
district court were sufficient. I.C. § 19-2522(6). 
The limited information before the district court at sentencing in this case was not 
an adequate substitute for an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation, particularly where Mr. Moore's 
mental health issues were raised both prior to his guilty plea, several times prior to 
sentencing, and during sentencing. The August 2008 evaluation performed through 
Saint Alphonsus did not meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522. Although the 
substance abuse evaluation mentioned Mr. Moore's mental health, it did not inform the 
court on all of the I.C. § 19-2522 factors, such as consideration of whether treatment is 
available for a defendant's mental condition, the relative risks and benefits of treatment 
or nontreatment, and the risk of danger that the defendant presents to the public. (PSI, 
pp.22-31.) Therefore, there never was a mental health evaluation which complied with 
the then-existing requirements of I.C. § 19-2522. The Court of Appeals' Opinion is 
inconsistent with the requirements of the statute as the majority opinion concluded that 
the district court could rely on the other mental health information concerning 
Mr. Moore's mental health condition and history, in lieu of ordering a psychological 
evaluation. The Court thus erroneously affirmed the decision by the district court. 
In holding that the district court could rely on the "extensive information" in the 
PSI regarding Mr. Moore's mental health, the Court impliedly found that Mr. Moore's 
mental health was a significant factor at sentencing. 
While the decision to order a psychological evaluation lies within the sentencing 
court's discretion, a psychological evaluation is mandatory under some circumstances, 




sentencing," whereupon "the court shall appoint one (1) 
psychologist to examine and report upon the mental condition of 
the defendant." I.C. § 19-2522(1) (emphasis added); State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 
(Ct. App. 2008). 
The legal standards governing the district court's decision whether to order a 
psychological evaluation and report are contained in I.C. §19-2522: 
(1) If there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will 
be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court 
shall appoint least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to 
examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant. 
§ 19-2522( 1 ). 
The district court has discretion to deny a defendant's request for a psychological 
evaluation. v. Collins, 144 Idaho 408, 409 (Ct. App. 2007). However, with any 
discretionary decision, the district court must act within the bounds of its discretion, 
consistent with applicable legal principles. State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 823 
(Ct. App. 2008). The applicable legal standard for reviewing a district court's decision to 
deny a psychological evaluation is governed by I.C. § 19-2522(1 ). State v. Craner, 137 
Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 2002). 
A psychological evaluation is mandatory if "there is reason to believe the mental 
condition of the defendant would be a significant factor at sentencing." State v. Hanson, 
152 Idaho 314, 318 (2012). In Hanson, the defendant requested a psychological 
evaluation prior to sentencing. Hanson, 152 Idaho at 318. The district court denied the 
request, finding, inter alia, that a psychological evaluation was not necessary because it 
did not believe that the additional information provided by a psychological evaluation 
would be helpful at sentencing. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court granted review and 
13 
remanded the case so that a psychological evaluation could be ordered. Id. 318, 
In so doing, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a "defendant's mental condition is 
a significant factor at sentencing if the sentencing court is aware of a defendant's 
lengthy history of serious mental illness." Id. at 319-320. 
The Court found that record demonstrated that the defendant's mental 
condition was a significant factor at sentencing based on: (1) a substantial history of 
mental illness, including past hospitalizations for mental health issues; (2) Mr. Hanson's 
erratic and unusual behaviors while in custody; (3) the comments made by the district 
court at sentencing regarding that "certain mental factors" existed and that the 
defendant did need psychological treatment; (4) at sentencing the district court 
recommended various treatments and therapies for the defendant during his period of 
incarceration and noted that he should receive a psychological evaluation. Id. at 321. 
The Hanson Court found that the record demonstrated that the defendant's mental 
condition was a significant factor at sentencing and reversed the district court's denial of 
Hanson's request for a psychological evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 319-320. Here, like in Hanson, 
Mr. Moore's mental health condition was a significant factor at sentencing, and the facts 
of this case are similar to those in Hanson. 
Like the district court in Hanson, the district court in Mr. Moore's case knew that 
Mr. Moore was suffering from a serious mental illness which caused him to hear voices 
and be in a psychotic state. (3/23/10 Tr., p.11, L.25 - p.12, L.2.) The district court 
14 
that Moore's mental health dated back as far as 2002.9 
(3/23/10 Tr., p.11, ) Mr. had previously undergone psychiatric 
hospitalizations for mental illness. (PSI, p.150.) The record is replete with indications 
that Mr. Moore suffered from severe mental health issues and those issues were 
him on the date of the Mr. Moore's defense counsel, after speaking 
to him at the jail while he was reviewing his PSI, revealed that, "at the time of this 
incident, Mr. Moore was experiencing hallucinations, symptoms of his schizophrenia ... 
[a]nd it has come to my attention that his mental health issues probably played a very 
big role in this incident." (3/23/10 Tr., p.9, L.14 - p.10, L.9.) Notably, when Mr. Moore 
was seen in 2003, he spoke to his treatment provider about his auditory and visual 
hallucinations and expressed his concern that, because of his hallucinations, he did not 
know what was real and what was not real and that he feared that he was going to end 
up hurting someone. (PSI, p.192.) In 2009, in this case, Mr. Moore backhanded a store 
clerk who was trying to stop him from shoplifting. (PSI, p.2.) 
However, the district court concluded that a court-ordered evaluation was not 
necessary because it already knew, based upon a past evaluation, that Mr. Moore had 
a history of schizophrenic-type mental illness. (3/23/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.14-21.) Yet, 
knowledge of a past diagnosis is not a sufficient substitute for all of the information 
contained in an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation. Additionally, like in Hanson, the district court 
commented at sentencing regarding Mr. Moore's mental health problems, "I 
acknowledge that you have mental health problems. But there are people with mental 
health problems that don't commit crimes. They get on their medicines and they stay on 
9 The records actually go back as far as 1983, when Mr. Moore was a juvenile. (PSI, 
pp.71-79.) 
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them." (3/30/10 ., p.11, Ls.9-1 ) The district court then imposed its sentence of five 
with one year fixed, telling Mr. Moore that the was "in light of your need 
to get stabilized on your medication and some structure." (3/30/10 Tr., p.11, L.25 -
p.12, L.5.) 
Mr. Moore's mental health should have been a significant mitigating factor at 
sentencing, but the district court may have viewed Mr. Moore's acts attributable to his 
mental health condition as aggravating facts suggesting that Mr. Moore could not be 
compliant on probation. At sentencing, the district court commented on the fact that 
Mr. Moore failed to appear for his sentencing hearing: "And for whatever reason you 
just decided not to show. It wasn't like you committed some other big crime or fled the 
country or something. You were just back on the street drinking and getting in trouble." 
(3/30/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.19-23.) Had the district court obtained a mental health evaluation 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, the court could have referred to the evaluation to assist the 
court in determining the risk Mr. Moore posed to the community. 
In sum, because the district court considered Mr. Moore's mental health when 
sentencing him, thus indicating that Mr. Moore's mental health was a significant factor at 
sentencing, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Moore's request and refused to 
order a mental health evaluation pursuant I.C. § 19-2522. The Court of Appeals 
erroneously affirmed the decision of the district court by disregarding the statutory 
requirements for an evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. Mr. Moore asks this Court to 
grant review of all of the issues on appeal.10 
10 The issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Moore's 
I.C.R. 35 motion was not briefed herein, as it was fully briefed in Appellant's Brief. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Moore respectfully requests that his for Review granted and that 
this Court vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court 
for a mental health evaluation a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 2ih day of June, 2014. 
SALLY J/ COOLEY 
Deput{State Appellate Public Defender 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.13-17.) Mr. Moore's arguments regarding this issue are hereby 
incorporated by reference. 
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